Thefts in remote banking systems: incident investigations
By
Mikhail
Prokhorenko
on September 11, 2014. 11:00 am
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Backdoor
Electronic
Payments
Financial
malware
Internet
Banking
Keyloggers
Vulnerabilities
and exploits
Contents
More and more companies are asking Kaspersky Lab to carry out detailed
investigations of malware-related IT security incidents affecting their
business.
In this article, we will describe a typical cybercriminal attack aiming at
stealing corporate financial assets from a remote banking system.
Description of the Incident
An organization recently asked Kaspersky Lab to investigate an incident that had
occurred in its corporate remote banking system: a bank representative contacted
the organization’s accounting department and asked for confirmation of a payment
worth 3 million rubles (about US$80,000). It transpired that nobody in the
organization had ever heard of this payment. The accountant was certain that he
did not make that payment; he explained that he was out on his lunch break at
the time of the transaction.
The accountant used banking software on his workstation to prepare payment
orders and send them to the bank. The logs on this software recorded two
suspicious payments to the same address. The first was a relatively small
payment of 300,000 rubles. This did not sound any alarm bells, and was processed
without a query. The second payment, worth 3 million rubles, alerted the staff
at the company’s bank.
It was clear that the accountant had not made the payments himself, so the
organization suspected a malware attack. But how was that possible? They were
using specialized banking software with password protection. They required a
special file to access the remote banking system, and the bank itself would
check the IP address of the sender of any payment.
Investigation
The main goal of a malware incident investigation is to accurately assess the
consequences of the attack, identify every compromised computer and establish
exactly how the malware penetrated the victim computer(s). The organization
affected can then use this information to effectively mitigate the damage and
address weaknesses in its corporate security system to prevent such incidents
from happening in the future.
During the investigation, it is also sometimes possible to detect
hitherto-unknown malware species and add their signatures to the security
databases, protecting other users from their future impact.
In this case an image of the hard disk from the accountant’s desktop was
provided to Kaspersky Lab’s Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) for analysis
and investigation.
Remote Access to Desktop
During our first-pass analysis of the accountant’s hard drive, we identified a
modified version of the legal
Remote
Manipulator System
which enables remote access to the computer. This type of software is often used
by accountants and system administrators. However, this program was located in a
suspicious catalogue, had a suspicious name (‘C:\windows\dotcom\wmiterm.exe’ is
an overly “system-related” path , so even an advanced user is unlikely to smell
a rat), and had two modifications to conceal its operation:
These modifications are typical of malware, so we added signatures for this
program to Kaspersky Lab’s antivirus databases – it is detected as malicious
with the verdict ‘Backdoor.Win32.RMS’.
While analyzing the operation of Backdoor.Win32.RMS, we discovered that the
cybercriminals used it to download another malware program onto the victim
computer, ‘Backdoor.Win32.Agent’. (This detection was added to Kaspersky Lab
products immediately). That backdoor provided remote VNC (Virtual Network
Computing) access to the victim computer. Interestingly, the code of this
malware program has a lot in common with the ‘hVNC’ module of the Carberp
Trojan. Carberp’s source code is available for public access.
So, how did Backdoor.Win32.RMS sneak onto the accountant’s desktop?
Infecting a Corporate Desktop
In the Microsoft Outlook database, stored in the file ‘outlook.pst’ on the hard
drive, we found an email containing an attachment named “запрос
ИФНС
№
АС-4-31339.doc”
(‘Federal Tax Service request no. AC-4-31339.doc’). Kaspersky Lab Anti-Virus
detected that Microsoft Office document as malicious with the verdict
‘Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.’
The cybercriminals used social engineering methods: the email was sent in the
name of Russia’s Federal Tax Service, called for immediate action, and provided
contact details of real Tax Service officers.
“Federal Taxation Service. Please provide all required documents as soon as
possible.”
The accountant would certainly have opened the attachment, which exploited a
vulnerability in Microsoft Word to download a self-unpacking archive from a
remote server and then initialize the unpacking. The archive contained two
files: ‘SYST.EXE’, a renamed version of the file archiver ‘7zip’, and ‘SYST’.
While unpacking, the source archive launched the archive program ‘SYST.EXE’ with
parameters instructing it to unpack the password-protected archive ‘SYST’ using
the incorporated password. This trick of using a password-protected password
successfully bypasses security software’s attempts at static unpacking of the
file, impeding its detection.
Unpacking ‘SYST’ created the following: the ‘Backdoor.Win32.RMS’ file (which we
detected earlier) and the ‘INST.CMD’ script which installed the backdoor in the
system. This is the script that copied the malicious program’s files into the
folder ‘C:\windows\dotcom’.
After we detected the backdoors, we began to understand how the cybercriminals
could steal the money. If they had remote access to the computer, they could
have make their own payment order, and then the key file and the sender’s IP
address would be legitimate. But we still didn’t know how they criminals got the
password to access the banking software. We decided to look for a keylogger
program.
The keylogger
The file ‘Svchost.exe’ attracted our attention, located in the root of the
system disk. It turned out to be a keylogger (detection added with the verdict
‘Trojan-Spy.Win32.Delf’); it also contained functionality to manage the
configuration of Backdoor.Win32.RMS. This unusual capability was apparently
introduced by the cybercriminals because they needed a tool to control the
modified Remote Manipulator System: they had hidden this program’s entire user
interface and could use it to manage the configuration.
We also discovered that this keylogger was downloaded with the help of
Backdoor.Win32.RMS.
The keylogger sent a log containing all stolen information to the C&C at regular
intervals and kept an up-to-date copy of the log on the infected computer’s hard
drive. We found the banking password within the piles of information stolen by
the keylogger.
The battle plan
Following our research, we reconstructed the cybercriminals’ action plan:
As we got towards the end of the investigation, we discovered yet another
interesting fact: the IP-addresses of C&C servers for all malicious programs
used in the attack belonged to the same sub-network.
Diagram of the cybercriminal attack
We also found out that the cybercriminals acted very fast: it took them just
four days to carry out their planned crime. Three days were spent preparing, and
the plan was executed within just a few hours on the fourth day.
Day 1. The cybercriminals sent the email to the company’s accountant. The
accountant read the email, opened the attachment, and the malicious program
Backdoor.Win32.RMS was downloaded to his program. On the following days, the
cybercriminals used this program to watch the accountant’s activities.
Day 4. The cybercriminals used Backdoor.Win32.RMS to load the keylogger
Trojan-Spy.Win32.Delf to the victim computer and intercepted the password to the
banking software. Soon afterwards they loaded Backdoor.Win32.Agent and used it
to connect to the accountant’s computer. Then they sent payment orders from the
victim computer to the bank.
Notifying the cybercriminals’ victims
As the cybercriminals used several IP addresses from the same sub-network, we
decided to have a closer look at the C&C servers. As it turned out, the
cybercriminals made a mistake when configuring one of the servers, so any user
can see the HTTP requests to the C&C servers. That’s how we were able to track
down the IP addresses from which requests were sent using the keylogger’s
protocol. As we found out, there were several computers with different
IP-addresses infected with the keylogger.
There was one odd feature of this keylogger: when it was launched on an infected
computer, it downloaded the latest version of its log from the C&C server. Thus,
any user could review the keylogger’s log if they opened the appropriate URL
address in their web browser. We decided to have a close look at the HTTP
requests sent to the C&C server, and in them we found the names of the logs that
the keyloggers sent to the C&C server. In many cases, the logs contained the
name of the organization which owned the infected computer and the victims’
contacts (We could also find the victims’ IP addresses using the vulnerability
in the C&C server). This information helped us contact other victims (most of
them were accountants at SMBs) and warn them that their computers were infected.
They were very grateful for the information.
Features of banking attacks
As we said at the beginning of the article, this attack is a typical case of
stealing money from a company.
Members of staff who deal with commercially important information and handle the
company’s finances need training on the basics of IT security. The company must
implement security policies that would minimize the risk of employee negligence
causing an infection on the corporate network.
However, 0-day exploits are too expensive to use in attacks on regular
companies. Here we usually see exploits for known vulnerabilities. This means
simple steps like promptly updating software (especially Microsoft Office and
Java) and installing a quality security solution can ensure adequate levels of
protection.
Security products obviously won’t flag up the use of legitimate software. So
cybercriminals can use these applications in a bid to keep their operations
secret. In this attack, secrecy was ensured by using a version of Remote
Manipulator System with modifications introduced into its executable file. We
added a signature for this modified version of Remote Manipulator System so in
future Kaspersky Lab’s products will detect it.
If cybercriminals use the original, unmodified versions of legitimate software,
the only solution will be for security systems to notify the user every time a
potentially unwanted program is launched. All users, especially those who deal
with financial and other important documents, must remember that no security
system can provide absolute protection. They should pay attention to system
notifications and be alert to any anomalous behavior on their computer. It’s
important to notify security staff of any suspicious event in the system.
Ideally, default deny mode should be enabled on all computers used to make
payments in a remote banking system; this mode restricts Internet access and
prevents the launch of irrelevant, non-whitelisted software. The same applies to
computers used by corporate users to work with commercially important
(business-critical) information.
Conclusion
These days, the main driving force behind all cybercriminal actions is money.
Gaining access to remote banking systems is the most direct and straightforward
way of stealing money from an organization. It is little surprise that remote
banking systems are an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminal attacks.
Anyone who uses remote banking systems is more than familiar with the security
systems incorporated in them … but so are the cybercriminals. The use of
passwords, key files and tokens, as well as restricting IP access, can lull
users into a false sense of security.
However, none of these measures, whether taken individually or as a group, will
do anything to enhance security if they are implemented on a compromised
computer. On an infected machine, passwords can be intercepted, key files can be
copied. Cybercriminals can create a hidden desktop and use the original IP
address and the token connected to the victim computer.
When investigating security incidents we regularly encounter the following
situation: a malicious program is launched on a computer, but later it is
detected and removed from the system. Subsequently the affected computer is used
as before, continuing to carry out banking transactions with the accountant
confident that the problem has been solved.
Users must realize that once a malicious program is executed, the computer
affected should be considered compromised. The first malicious file only loads
the main malicious payload. That payload typically consists of programs which
update themselves all the time to escape detection by security products.
Alternatively, cybercriminals load legitimate software with modifications that
enable cybercriminals to connect to it via malicious C&C servers. In this case
the malicious programs will not be detected.
Overlooking this can cause huge damage to a company. If a malicious program has
been detected on a computer with critical information, incident response
measures must be taken immediately.
Sadly, our experience shows that organizations often sound the alarm too late,
when they are already facing financial loss or the shutdown of critical
computing services. Moreover, the response measures taken within corporations
usually prove ineffective, and often impede further investigation.
There is no such thing as a one-size-fits-all response to an incident. There are
too many possible attack methods out there. For example, in some cases shutting
the computer down immediately helps to preserve data that would be irreversibly
deleted by a malicious program after a certain period. In other situations,
though, a shutdown will destroy the RAM data that is vital to a subsequent
investigation. Only an incident investigation specialist can make the right
decision.
In any case, if there is the slightest suspicion of intrusion, any compromised
computer should be disconnected from the Internet and the corporate network, and
malware incident specialists should be called in.
Only a detailed investigation of a security incident can lead to an effective
response.